It’s Time for an Intervention!: Resolving the Conflict Between Rule 24(a)(2) and Article III Standing by Manring, Gregory R.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 85 Issue 5 Article 46 
2017 
It’s Time for an Intervention!: Resolving the Conflict Between Rule 
24(a)(2) and Article III Standing 
Gregory R. Manring 
Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts 
Commons, and the Judges Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gregory R. Manring, It’s Time for an Intervention!: Resolving the Conflict Between Rule 24(a)(2) and Article 
III Standing, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 2525 (2017). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol85/iss5/46 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 2525 
IT’S TIME FOR AN INTERVENTION!:  
RESOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RULE 
24(a)(2) AND ARTICLE III STANDING 
Gregory R. Manring* 
 
Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides an 
important apparatus by which a nonparty to a dispute may enter by her own 
initiative to protect an unrepresented interest.  Despite the utility and 
function in balancing the interests of private parties and the effects that 
their disputes have on third parties, especially in the public law realm, 
intervention’s requirements are unclear.  Whether intervenors of right must 
independently satisfy Article III standing requirements or whether Article 
III is satisfied by the existence of a case or controversy between the original 
parties remains unresolved.  The courts of appeals are currently split on the 
issue—seven do not require Rule 24(a)(2) intervenors to show standing and 
three do.  These categorical approaches, however, are both functionally 
and legally inadequate. 
This Note argues that federal courts should employ an approach that is 
more related to maintaining the benefits of Rule 24 without running afoul of 
Article III—a task the yes-or-no approach is ill equipped to handle.  
Ultimately, an approach that is based on employing a standing analysis 
only where the Case or Controversy Clause is implicated anew allows the 
greatest access to the intervention device without running the risk of 
entertaining nonjusticiable disputes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution created and vested the power to 
resolve certain cases and controversies in the federal judiciary.1  A federal 
court’s power to entertain a dispute turns on whether a party has standing to 
assert that claim—that is, whether a party alleges that she has suffered an 
actual, redressable injury that is traceable to the alleged conduct.2 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) (“the Rule”) defines the 
circumstances under which a nonparty to a dispute has the right to enter the 
dispute to protect an interest in the outcome.3  An affected party has the 
right to intervene when she alleges impairment of an interest and a lack of 
existing adequate representation for that interest.4 
However, whether such intervention constitutes a new case or 
controversy—subject to a separate standing analysis—remains unresolved.5  
This Note seeks to balance constitutional and statutory requirements with 
judicial efficiency concerns and public interest and policy considerations 
that influence when a separate standing analysis is appropriate for Rule 
24(a)(2) motions.6 
Accordingly, Part I of this Note examines the requirements and purpose 
of Rule 24(a)(2) intervention and the Case or Controversy Clause.  It also 
discusses different types of intervenors and their relationship with the 
intervention of right and Article III standing requirements.  Part II discusses 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s lack of guidance on the subject and the opposing 
views of the federal circuits that have filled this void.  Finally, Part III 
proposes a resolution to this problem.  A categorical approach to whether 
Article III standing is required for Rule 24(a)(2) intervention fails to serve 
the purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Case or 
Controversy Clause.  Because intervention itself does not trigger the Case 
or Controversy Clause’s jurisdictional constraints, federal courts should 
adopt a more nuanced inquiry to determine whether a standing analysis is 
truly necessary. 
I.  THE CASE OR CONTROVERSY CLAUSE 
AND INTERVENTION OF RIGHT 
The discordant relationship between the Case or Controversy Clause and 
Rule 24 intervention of right is long standing and unsettled.7  Each doctrine 
 
 1. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 2. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 3. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2); see also infra Part I.A. 
 4. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2); see also infra Part I.A.2. 
 5. See, e.g., Laroe Estates, Inc. v. Town of Chester, 828 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(noting that “a circuit split on this issue has persisted for some time”), cert. granted, 137 S. 
Ct. 810 (2017); see also infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Parts II–III. 
 7. The Rule 24 amendment and expansion in 1966 spawned this circuit split. See infra 
note 21.  Federal courts have not uniformly resolved the issue of intervenor standing over the 
subsequent five decades. See infra Part II. 
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alone is the subject of extensive scholarly and judicial interpretation.8  At 
the intersection of these two doctrines lies a grey area of grey areas.  Must 
intervenors of right independently satisfy Article III’s jurisdictional 
limitations?  What are the purposes of these doctrines, and does requiring or 
forgoing a standing analysis better serve them?  To provide context for 
answering these questions, Part I.A provides an overview of the history and 
requirements of intervention of right.  Next, Part I.B explains Article III 
standing’s demands and purpose.  Part I.C then discusses the different types 
of intervenors and their relationship with these two doctrines. 
A.  Rule 24(a)(2) Intervention of Right 
Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the mechanism 
by which a nonparty to litigation may join in a suit.9  Intervention may be 
“permissive”—a court may choose to allow it10—or “of right”—a court 
must allow it.11  Permissive intervention is possible where a statute gives a 
conditional right12 or where the would-be intervenor “has a claim or 
defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or 
fact.”13  Intervention is a right in two instances:  where a federal statute 
gives such a right14 and where the would-be intervenor “claims an 
interest . . . and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical 
matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless 
existing parties adequately represent that interest.”15  The latter is the 
primary focus of this Note.  To better conceptualize the tension between the 
Case or Controversy Clause and Rule 24, Part I.A.1 discusses the history 
and purpose of intervention, Part I.A.2 turns to the specific requirements for 
intervention of right, and Part I.A.3 explains the rights of intervenors. 
 
 8. See infra Part I.A–B. 
 9. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24. 
 10. See id. 24(b). 
 11. See id. 24(a). 
 12. Id. 24(b)(1)(A). 
 13. Id. 24(b)(1)(B).  Intervention is also permissive where a government agency or 
official seeks to intervene where one of the party’s claims is based on a statute, executive 
order, regulation, or a requirement or agreement administered by the officer or agency. Id.  
24(b)(2). 
 14. Id. 24(a)(1).  Whether standing is necessary to intervene is an important 
consideration for whether Congress may be prohibited from creating a statutory right to 
intervene in some instances due to the limitations on Congress’s ability to confer a right of 
action. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 566–67 (1992). 
 15. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2); see also Purcell v. BankAtlantic Fin. Corp., 85 F.3d 1508, 
1512 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that an intervenor of right must establish timeliness in addition 
to interest, impairment, and inadequate representation). But see Ross v. Marshall, 426 F.3d 
745, 753 (5th Cir. 2005) (asserting that intervention should be allowed where “no one would 
be hurt and greater justice could be attained” (quoting Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 
1205 (5th Cir. 1994))). 
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1.  What Is Intervention? 
Intervention is a relatively new phenomenon in American procedure.16  
However, its use and availability have greatly expanded over the last 
century.17  Rule 24’s predecessor, Equity Rule 37, was adopted in 1912 and 
provided that “[a]nyone claiming an interest in the litigation may at any 
time be permitted to assert his right by intervention, but the intervention 
shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main 
proceeding.”18  The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gave 
intervention an even greater role in federal litigation.19 
Since the inception of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24 has 
been amended several times.20  The most recent change to Rule 24(a) 
occurred in 1966 when the text was modified to make intervention of right 
less restrictive.21  Before this change, a party had to show that she might be 
bound by the resulting judgment22 or that she may be “adversely affected 
by a distribution or other disposition of property.”23  The new Rule 
incorporated both of these ideas and expanded the requisite effect to 
encompass impaired interests that were not adequately represented.24  Thus, 
the modern Rule 24 allows a nonparty to a dispute to intervene to protect an 
interest that is unrepresented by the existing parties.25 
 
 16. See 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1901 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing the historical background of 
intervention). 
 17. See id.; see also James Wm. Moore & Edward H. Levi, Federal Intervention I.  The 
Right to Intervene and Reorganization, 45 YALE L.J. 565 (1936). 
 18. FED. EQUITY R. 37 (1912) (repealed 1938). 
 19. See 7C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 16, § 1901; see also Cascade Nat. Gas 
Corp. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 133 (1967) (“Rule 24(a)(3) was not merely a 
restatement of existing federal practice at law and in equity.”). 
 20. See Tyler R. Stradling & Doyle S. Byers, Intervening in the Case (or Controversy):  
Article III Standing, Rule 24 Intervention, and the Conflict in the Federal Courts, 2003 BYU 
L. REV. 419, 423.  For a brief discussion on how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are 
amended, see id. at 423–24. 
 21. See id. at 423; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee’s note to 1966 
amendment (“The general purpose of original Rule 24(a)(2) was to entitle an absentee, 
purportedly represented by a party, to intervene in the action if he could establish with fair 
probability that the representation was inadequate.  Thus, where an action is being 
prosecuted or defended by a trustee, a beneficiary of the trust should have a right to 
intervene if he can show that the trustee’s representation of his interest probably is 
inadequate; similarly a member of a class should have the right to intervene in a class action 
if he can show the inadequacy of the representation of his interest by the representative 
parties before the court.”). 
 22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) (1963) (amended 1966). 
 23. Id. 24(a)(3).  Before 1966, however, the property provision was not subject to an 
adequate representation caveat. See id. 
 24. See id. 24(a)(2). 
 25. See id. 
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Although the Rule’s purpose remained substantially the same, the 
loosening of the interest requirement led to divergence among the circuits 
regarding what interests are sufficient to merit intervention of right.26 
2.  Intervention of Right Requirements 
To intervene under Rule 24(a)(2), a proposed intervenor must 
demonstrate an interest that is impaired and not adequately represented by 
the existing parties.27  This interest must be specific and should represent a 
“significantly protectable interest.”28 
The Supreme Court has ruled twice on the sufficiency of an interest for 
the purposes of Rule 24(a)(2).  The Court decided Cascade Natural Gas 
Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.29 in 1967, the year after the Rule 24(a) 
amendment.30  In El Paso, the Court allowed Cascade Natural Gas Corp., 
the State of California, and Southern California Edison to intervene in a 
natural gas antitrust suit to protect their interests in a competitive system.31  
Four years later, in Donaldson v. United States,32 the Court ruled that the 
proposed intervenor’s interest in obtaining records did not afford him a 
right to intervene in an IRS enforcement proceeding under Rule 24.33 
With such limited guidance, what constitutes a protectable interest varies 
substantially among the circuits.  Some circuits interpret the interest 
requirement as a lenient standard.34  Others construe the standard more 
narrowly,35 even tying it to the more onerous Article III standing 
requirement.36  Generally, as in the previous iteration of Rule 24, a party 
may intervene if she would be bound by the judgment in the litigation.37  
Property interests, although sufficient in all circuits, are not necessary as 
they were in the previous version of the Rule.38  However, whether a purely 
 
 26. See Juliet Johnson Karastelev, Note, On the Outside Seeking In:  Must Intervenors 
Demonstrate Standing to Join a Lawsuit?, 52 DUKE L.J. 455, 457 (2002); see also Carl 
Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 415, 432–36 (1991). 
 27. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). 
 28. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986) (quoting Donaldson v. United States, 
400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971)). 
 29. 386 U.S. 129 (1967). 
 30. See id. 
 31. Id. at 135. 
 32. 400 U.S. 517 (1971). 
 33. Id. at 531. 
 34. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 398 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[I]n this circuit we 
subscribe to a ‘rather expansive notion of the interest sufficient to invoke intervention of 
right.’” (quoting Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1997))). 
 35. For example, recently in Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d 653 (5th Cir. 2015), the 
Fifth Circuit delineated a particularly narrow construction of the interest requirement.  The 
court held that “the inquiry turns on whether the intervenor has a stake in the matter that 
goes beyond a generalized preference that the case come out a certain way” and that “an 
intervenor fails to show a sufficient interest when he seeks to intervene solely for 
ideological, economic, or precedential reasons.” Id. at 657. 
 36. See, e.g., Aurora Loan Servs., Inc. v. Craddieth, 442 F.3d 1018, 1022 (7th Cir. 
2006); see also infra Part II.C.1. 
 37. See, e.g., Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., 619 F.3d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 38. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 526 F.3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(discussing that “use and enjoyment of the unique aesthetic environment of [a] wilderness 
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economic interest constitutes a “significantly protectable interest” varies 
among the federal circuits.39 
A Rule 24(a)(2) movant must also show that her interest would be 
impaired by the litigation.40  Like in the former version of the Rule, this 
impairment may be that the party would be bound by the judgment.41  
Unlike with the old Rule, however, a negative stare decisis effect42 or 
another form of practical impairment may be sufficient to satisfy this 
prong.43 
Even if a proposed intervenor demonstrates the requisite impaired 
interest, intervention of right will be improper where a party to the action 
already adequately represents the interest.44  The bar to establishing lack of 
adequate representation is relatively low.45  Showing that existing parties 
hold different or adverse objectives is typically sufficient to meet this 
burden.46  In rare cases, some courts will dismiss an intervenor as a party 
when her interests become aligned with the original plaintiff over the course 
of litigation.47 
 
area” was a sufficient interest to intervene); San Juan County v. United States, 503 F.3d 
1163, 1201 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that environmental organizations’ interest in the impact 
of vehicular traffic was sufficient to intervene); Grutter, 188 F.3d at 398 (finding that 
prospective students’ interest in protecting educational opportunities was sufficient to 
intervene); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (“[T]he desire to 
use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a 
cognizable interest . . . .”); supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 39. See Flying J, Inc. v. Van Hollen, 578 F.3d 569, 572 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that gas 
companies that stood to lose business from a challenged state law had an interest on those 
grounds alone); Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 295 F.3d 1111, 1115 
(10th Cir. 2002) (“The threat of economic injury from the outcome of litigation undoubtedly 
gives a petitioner the requisite [Rule 24(a)(2)] interest.”). But see Mountain Top Condo. 
Ass’n v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, Inc., 72 F.3d 361, 366 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that a 
“mere economic interest . . . is insufficient to support the right to intervene”); New Orleans 
Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding that 
“an economic interest alone is insufficient . . . for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2)”). 
 40. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). 
 41. See 7C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 16, § 1908.2, at 368. 
 42. See id. § 1908.2, at 369. 
 43. See id. § 1908.2, at 374 n.18 (identifying a broad range of sufficient practical 
impairments such as environmental impact, access to information, and ability to conduct 
business). 
 44. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). 
 45. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972) (“The 
requirement of the Rule is satisfied if the applicant shows that representation of his interest 
‘may be’ inadequate; and the burden of making that showing should be treated as 
minimal.”). 
 46. See 7C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 16, § 1909, at 440. 
 47. See, e.g., Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & 
Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary (BAMN) v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 652 
F.3d 607, 633 (6th Cir. 2011). 
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3.  Rights of Intervening Parties 
Before the Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
in 1938, Equity Rule 37 gave intervenors a subordinated role.48  However, 
in crafting Rule 24, this caveat to intervention was discarded.49 
Today, Rule 24 is commonly understood as granting an intervening party 
the same rights as the original party to the dispute.50  As such, she may take 
unilateral action such as moving to dismiss without the consent of the 
original party.51  Circuits that require intervenors to demonstrate an 
independent basis for standing typically place intervenors on equal footing 
with the original parties.52  However, the inherent equal rights of 
intervenors in circuits that do not require standing seem to exist only to the 
extent of the scope of the original case or controversy.53 
More recently, the Supreme Court has made it clear that an intervenor 
may not “step into the shoes of the original party” where she has not 
demonstrated an independent basis for Article III standing.54  But, what 
intervening party actions fall within and without the equal-footing 
framework remains unresolved.55 
B.  The Case or Controversy Clause 
and the Standing Requirement 
The Case or Controversy Clause56 limits the disputes the federal 
judiciary may adjudicate.57  For a dispute to rise to the level of a case or 
 
 48. See 7C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 16, § 1920, at 608. 
 49. See id.; see also Daniel C. Hopkinson, The New Federal Rules of Procedure as 
Compared with the Former Federal Equity Rules and the Wisconsin Code, 23 MARQ. L. 
REV. 159, 170 (1939). 
 50. See 7C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 16, § 1920, at 611–12. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See, e.g., Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t v. Reich, 40 F.3d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 
1994). 
 53. See, e.g., Spangler v. United States, 415 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1969) (“The 
whole tenor and frame work of the Rules of Civil Procedure preclude application of a 
standard which strictly limits the intervenor to those defenses and counterclaims which the 
original defendant could himself have interposed.  Where there exists a sufficiently close 
relationship between the claims and defenses of the intervenor and those of the original 
defendant to permit adjudication of all claims in one forum and in one suit without 
unnecessary delay—and to avoid as well the delay and waste of judicial resources attendant 
upon requiring separate trials—the district court is without discretion to deny the intervenor 
the opportunity to advance such claims.” (quoting Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 325 F.2d 822, 827 (2d Cir. 1963))). 
 54. Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732, 1736 (2016) (quoting Arizonans for 
Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997)). 
 55. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 56. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in 
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—
to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two 
or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of 
different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of 
2017] RULE 24(a)(2) AND ARTICLE III STANDING 2533 
controversy, the party bringing it must have Article III standing.58  The 
standing inquiry assesses “whether the plaintiff has ‘alleged such a personal 
stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of 
federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial 
powers on his behalf.”59  Accordingly, Part I.B.1 discusses the history and 
function of the Case or Controversy Clause, Part I.B.2 defines the 
requirements to show jurisdictional standing, and Part I.B.3 concludes with 
the circumstances in which courts typically require a party to show 
standing. 
1.  The Purpose of the Case or Controversy Clause 
and the Standing Requirement 
The justiciability requirements imposed by the Case or Controversy 
Clause have been extrapolated to include both prudential requirements, such 
as the prohibition on third-party standing and the prohibition of generalized 
grievances,60 and jurisdictional requirements: 
[T]he judicial power of federal courts is constitutionally restricted to 
“cases” and “controversies.”  As is so often the situation in constitutional 
adjudication, those two words have an iceberg quality, containing beneath 
their surface simplicity submerged complexities which go to the very 
heart of our constitutional form of government.  Embodied in the words 
“cases” and “controversies” are two complementary but somewhat 
different limitations.  In part those words limit the business of federal 
courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form 
historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process.  
And in part those words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a 
tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not 
intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.61 
To better understand when a standing analysis is appropriate, Part I.B.1.a 
expands on standing as a protector of the separation of powers and Part 
I.B.1.b considers how the standing requirement promotes judicial efficiency 
and issue presentation. 
 
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or 
Subjects.” (emphasis added)). 
 57. Id.; see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (“If a dispute 
is not a proper case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it, or expounding 
the law in the course of doing so.”). 
 58. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004). 
 59. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
204 (1962)). 
 60. Because prudential standing is not jurisdictional, it is generally accepted that it can 
be forgone or eliminated by the Court or by Congress. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of 
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 
885 (1983).  For ease of exposition, this Note examines jurisdictional requirements that 
cannot be waived. 
 61. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1968). 
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a.  Standing as a Jurisdictional Baseline 
Standing limits the power of the federal judiciary to infringe on the 
powers of the other branches of government by permitting it to resolve 
disputes only where an actual, not potential, controversy exists: 
The legislative and executive departments of the Federal Government, no 
less than the judicial department, have a duty to defend the Constitution.  
That shared obligation is incompatible with the suggestion that federal 
courts might wield an “unconditioned authority to determine the 
constitutionality of legislative or executive acts.”  For the federal courts to 
decide questions of law arising outside of cases and controversies would 
be inimical to the Constitution’s democratic character. And the resulting 
conflict between the judicial and the political branches would not, “in the 
long run, be beneficial to either.”62 
If the federal judiciary had the power to interpret any statute regardless of 
whether its violation or application actually injured someone, in effect it 
would have the power to legislate.63  Similarly, the ability to issue advisory 
opinions could infringe on the legislature’s ability to give meaning to laws 
and the executive’s mandate to execute laws.64  Standing mitigates this 
conflict by providing the judiciary the power to resolve a dispute only 
where (1) a determination of the parties’ rights is necessary and (2) the 
dispute can be resolved through the judicial process.65 
b.  Standing as a Facilitator of the Judicial Process 
The standing requirement also promotes judicial efficiency.66  
Historically, the federal judiciary’s role has been to resolve disputes 
between individuals rather than to determine the merits of general, 
unparticularized grievances.67  The standing requirement ensures that the 
federal judiciary’s resources are spent on the most pressing, actual disputes 
rather than the public’s claims at large.68 
Similarly, the standing requirement ensures that parties who are best 
suited to present and litigate an issue have their day in court.69  Because 
federal courts do not select the suits brought before them, “the allowance of 
public actions would produce uneven and sporadic review, the quality of 
 
 62. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 133 (2011) (first quoting 
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 
464, 471 (1982); then quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188–89 (1974)); 
see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146–47 (2013). 
 63. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–93 (2009). 
 64. See id. 
 65. See Winn, 563 U.S. at 133. 
 66. See, e.g., Richardson, 418 U.S. at 192 (Powell, J., concurring) (discussing the 
negative implications of allowing federal courts to resolve public interest tax suits). 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2680 (2013) (“[C]oncrete 
adverseness . . . sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends 
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
204 (1962))). 
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which would be influenced by the resources and skill of the particular 
plaintiff.”70  Accordingly, a plaintiff with standing is not only better suited 
to represent the interests at stake but also aids courts in discerning 
important legal issues and arguments.71 
2.  Jurisdictional Standing Requirements 
Although standing jurisprudence is confused and ever changing,72 the 
Supreme Court maintains a basic three-part framework for evaluating 
standing:  (1) an injury that is (2) fairly traceable to the alleged conduct and 
(3) likely to be redressed by the requested relief.73  Part II.B.1.a gives an 
overview of the injury requirement, while Part II.B.1.b addresses the 
causation and redressability requirements. 
a.  Injury 
Two factors determine whether an injury is an “injury in fact” that 
satisfies the standing requirement:  particularization and concreteness.74 
First, the injury must be particularized.75  This means that an injury must 
not be shared by the public at large, although it need not be individual to the 
party.76 
Second, the injury must be concrete.77  Tangible injuries such as physical 
harm more easily pass the concreteness test than intangible injuries.78  
However, intangible injuries, such as being “deprived of the benefits of 
interracial association arising from living in an integrated community free 
of housing discrimination,”79 may nonetheless be concrete.80  The 
concreteness of intangible injuries is informed by two factors:  (1) “whether 
an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has 
traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or 
American courts”81 and (2) whether Congress has designated such an 
 
 70. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 190–91 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 71. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 204. 
 72. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 55 (7th ed. 2016) (“Both justices 
and commentators have frequently identified standing as one of the most confused areas of 
the law.”). 
 73. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
 74. See generally Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
 75. Id. at 1548 (“Particularization is necessary to establish injury in fact, but it is not 
sufficient.”); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 508 (1975) (finding that “[a]bsent the necessary allegations of demonstrable, 
particularized injury, there can be no confidence of ‘a real need to exercise the power of 
judicial review’” (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221–22 
(1974))). 
 76. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548. 
 77. Id. at 1548–49. 
 78. See id. at 1549. 
 79. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 369 (1982). 
 80. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
 81. Id.  Spokeo made clear that not every statutory violation is a concrete injury. See id. 
at 1549–50.  Justice Alito gave the example of a consumer reporting agency filing to give 
notice to a user of its information in violation of an act of Congress. See id. at 1550.  If the 
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intangible injury as legally cognizable.82  Even if a statutory violation 
causes no harm, it nonetheless may constitute an injury in fact where the 
violation presents a “material risk of harm.”83 
b.  Causation and Redressability 
Causation and redressability are intertwined and often addressed 
together.84  They are closely linked because causation itself helps federal 
courts determine whether granting the plaintiff the requested relief will end 
or remedy the alleged injury.85  A plaintiff must allege that “the asserted 
injury was the consequence of the defendants’ actions, or that the 
prospective relief will remove the harm.”86  A plaintiff must also allege that 
injury is “fairly traceable to the defendants allegedly unlawful conduct.”87  
Finally, she must allege that the injury is “likely to be redressed by the 
requested relief.”88 
3.  Who Needs Standing? 
Typically, the plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving 
standing.89  Standing is treated as a question of subject matter jurisdiction90:  
an action where the plaintiff lacks standing may be properly dismissed 
pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion91 or by the court sua sponte.92  Courts 
typically require a single plaintiff in a multiplaintiff action to demonstrate 
standing.93 
 
information were true, there would be no injury in fact to the user, and if some information 
were inaccurate, such as a zip code, the injury would not necessarily rise to the level of 
concreteness. Id. 
 82. Id. at 1549 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)). 
 83. Id. at 1550. 
 84. See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.5, at 389 (3d ed. 2008). 
 85. See id. § 3531.6. 
 86. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975) (discussing the baseline requirements of 
Article III standing). 
 87. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 84, § 3531.15, at 301. 
 90. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255 (1986). 
 91. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). 
 92. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998) (“[I]f the 
record discloses that the lower court was without jurisdiction this court will notice the defect, 
although the parties make no contention concerning it.” (quoting United States v. Corrick, 
298 U.S. 435, 440 (1936))); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 
(1908). 
 93. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 
(2006) (“[T]he presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-
or-controversy requirement.”); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 826 n.1 (2002) 
(“Because we are likewise satisfied that [one plaintiff] has standing, we need not address 
whether [the other] also has standing.”); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 431 
n.19 (1998) (“Because both the City of New York and the health care appellees have 
standing, we need not consider whether the appellee unions also have standing to sue.”). But 
see FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 483–90 (1985) 
(addressing the Democratic National Committee’s standing, although the coplaintiff FEC 
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Still, there appear to be two important exceptions to this rule.  First, a 
court may be compelled to reexamine standing when a party who has not 
demonstrated standing obtains different relief from a party who has.94  
Second, a party must have standing to assert substantive legal theories that 
would affect a court’s consideration of the merits.95 
C.  Different Types of Intervenors 
Not all intervenors are created equal.  Depending on the circuit, the bar 
for intervention may vary and the intervenor’s ability to influence the 
course of the suit may diverge.  A third party may intervene as a defendant 
or a plaintiff under Rule 24, and some courts evaluate private and public 
law intervenors’ interests under different standards.  A practical approach to 
intervenor standing should address the confusing aspect of defendant 
standing while allowing judicial discretion regarding what constitutes a 
sufficient interest.  To that end, Part I.C.1 describes the differences between 
intervenor-plaintiffs and intervenor-defendants, and Part I.C.2 explores how 
private law and public law intervenors differ. 
1.  Plaintiffs v. Defendants 
The function of a standing analysis for defendants is not entirely clear.  
Article III and Supreme Court jurisprudence both indicate that defendants 
must have standing to satisfy Article III.96  But because once a plaintiff 
demonstrates Article III justiciability the defendant’s standing follows, this 
issue is rarely directly addressed.  The unusual circumstances in which 
courts examine defendant standing include “(1) in the trial court, when 
nonparties seek to be heard through intervention, and (2) on appeal, when 
parties against whom no relief was ordered seek to overturn the trial court’s 
judgment.”97 
 
had standing, because of the potential for interference with the FEC’s exclusive jurisdiction 
to enforce the Presidential Campaign Fund Act); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 333 (1977) 
(dismissing some plaintiffs’ claims for lack of standing while allowing others to proceed). 
 94. See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 402 n.22 
(1982) (refusing to reexamine Pennsylvania’s standing until it “obtains relief different from 
that sought by plaintiffs whose standing has not been questioned”). 
 95. See Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 631 F. Supp. 1153, 1157 n.19 (D. Haw. 1986) (“This court, 
however, does not have to rule on the standing of the [other plaintiffs] unless . . . their claims 
would materially affect this court’s consideration of the merits.  For example, only if they 
claimed different relief or different substantive theories would their status as additional 
plaintiffs in this suit be important.” (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 
Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 n.16 (1978))). But see Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 833 (5th Cir. 
1998) (holding that a jurisdictional issue does not arise when a party whose standing is 
unexamined asserts different grounds for granting the same relief requested by the party with 
standing). 
 96. See Matthew I. Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1550 (2012); see also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986) 
(finding that an intervenor-defendant-appellant could not maintain a suit on his own for lack 
of standing). 
 97. Hall, supra note 96, at 1542; see also Diamond, 476 U.S. at 68. 
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Indeed, a large number of Rule 24 motions are made by intervening 
defendants rather than plaintiffs.98  Because the original plaintiff has not 
directly asserted claims against the intervenor, the court may not rely on 
plaintiff’s standing to infer the defendant’s.  Thus, if all intervenor-
defendants were required to demonstrate standing, substantial confusion 
would result because the current tripartite framework is focused on plaintiff 
standing. 
2.  Public v. Private Law Litigation 
Intervention of right is a popular device used by public law99 litigants to 
protect a stake in the outcome of a lawsuit.100  This is often complicated by 
public law litigation’s “‘sprawling and amorphous’ party structure.”101  But 
Rule 24(a)(2) itself is clearly designed with private law litigants in mind.102  
Accordingly, courts have adapted the process to accommodate public law 
litigation.103  Courts may scrutinize the Rule 24 interest using a different 
standard for public law litigants.  For example, the Tenth Circuit “follows a 
very broad interpretation of the interest requirement with respect to public 
law issues.”104 
If the status of the interest of such public law intervenors is unclear, the 
standing (especially the injury requirement) of such parties is even less 
certain.105  Indeed, the concreteness and particularization requirements 
often preclude public interest litigants from asserting abstract injuries.106  
Moreover, the distinctness requirement prevents direct public law litigation 
on issues that affect the public at large.107  Congress cannot resolve this 
predicament through legislative action because it cannot confer standing on 
public law litigants after Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.108  However, 
 
 98. See Hall, supra note 96, at 1574. 
 99. This Note uses the term “public law” to refer to litigation intended to benefit the 
public at large and “private law” to refer to litigation aimed at resolving a dispute between 
two private parties.  For a more rigorous discussion of the distinctions between public and 
private law, see Randy E. Barnett, Foreword:  Four Senses of the Public Law-Private Law 
Distinction, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267 (1986). 
 100. Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 323 (1989) (“The concept of interest is important to public interest 
litigants because they represent large numbers of unorganized people, such as the poor, who 
individually have interests that may appear relatively insubstantial, or they seek to vindicate 
comparatively intangible interests like that of the general public in clean air.”). 
 101. Id. at 280 (quoting Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1302 (1976)). 
 102. See id. at 323 n.315 (discussing how the “property” or “transaction” language of 
Rule 24 is private law focused and poses a problem for public law intervenors whose 
interests are often less tangible than those mentioned in Rule 24’s text). 
 103. See Cascade Nat. Gas Corp. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 135 (1967) 
(indicating that the interest requirement might be relaxed in situations that involve important 
issues of public interest). 
 104. San Juan County v. United States, 503 F.3d 1163, 1201 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 105. See Tobias, supra note 100, at 323–26. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. 
 108. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
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Congress can provide a statutory right to intervene.109  Thus, the power of 
courts and Congress to create or define an interest is substantially reduced 
by an intervenor standing requirement:  if standing were always required, 
Congress’s and the courts’ power would be narrowed to instances in which 
a potential intervenor has standing but does not have a requisite interest. 
II.  STANDING ORDERS:  THE LOWER COURTS DIVIDE 
The Supreme Court has yet to directly address whether a Rule 24(a)(2) 
intervenor requires independent Article III standing.  In 1986, in Diamond 
v. Charles,110 the Court held that a standingless Rule 24(a)(2) intervenor 
may not appeal a decision on its own.111  But the Court also conspicuously 
declined to resolve whether Article III standing is initially required to 
intervene.112  In 2003, the Court faced the same question in McConnell v. 
FEC113 and again skirted the issue.114  Part II.A recounts the Diamond 
decision, and Part II.B discusses the McConnell decision.  Finally, Part II.C 
discusses how the federal circuits have dealt with this issue absent the 
Supreme Court’s guidance. 
A.  Diamond v. Charles 
Eugene Diamond was a pediatrician in Illinois who intervened as a 
defendant in a suit against the State of Illinois challenging the 
constitutionality of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975.115  The statute 
imposed various restrictions on providing abortions in the state.116  After 
the district court permanently enjoined enforcement of certain sections of 
the law, Diamond sought to appeal the injunction.117  The State of Illinois, 
however, declined to appeal.118  The Court ultimately found that Diamond 
lacked independent standing to defend the statute and that his status as an 
intervenor did not confer the necessary standing to maintain the litigation 
on his own.119 
The Court’s analysis in Diamond has resulted in conflicting inferences.  
If jurisdiction were originally improper, the Court would have been fully 
capable of declaring Diamond’s presence in the suit an improper exercise of 
 
 109. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(1). 
 110. 476 U.S. 54 (1986). 
 111. Id. at 68; see also id. at 70–71 (“[T]he mere fact that continued adjudication would 
provide a remedy for an injury that is only a byproduct of the suit itself does not mean that 
the injury is cognizable under Art. III.”). 
 112. Id. at 68–69 (“We need not decide today whether a party seeking to intervene before 
a District Court must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), but also the 
requirements of Art. III.”). 
 113. 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 
310 (2010). 
 114. Id. at 233. 
 115. Diamond, 476 U.S. at 56. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 61. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 64–68. 
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jurisdiction.120  Indeed, the Court likely opted to base its decision on the 
most readily available grounds for dismissal.121  Thus, Diamond only stands 
for the proposition that intervenors do not automatically have standing to 
appeal on their own. 
B.  McConnell v. FEC 
The Court again had the opportunity to address this issue in 
McConnell.122  Like in Diamond, intervenor-defendants sought to appeal a 
circuit court decision.123  However, unlike in Diamond, the original named 
defendant, the FEC, also appealed.124  This proved dispositive to the 
Court’s standing inquiry:  “[T]he Federal Election Commission (FEC) has 
standing, and therefore we need not address the standing of the intervenor-
defendants, whose position here is identical to the FEC’s.”125  Although it 
did not directly address the question of whether intervenors of right need 
standing to intervene as a preliminary matter, the Court’s invocation of 
Bowsher v. Synar126 insinuates that the Court has dispensed of the notion 
that standing might be required for intervenors asserting the same claims 
and requesting the same relief.127  However, although the Court appeared to 
treat intervenors as similarly exempt from standing requirements as 
coparties,128 the presence of the intervening party was not the issue at 
dispute, only the appealability.129 
Consequently, McConnell only stands for the proposition that intervenors 
do not need to demonstrate standing when appealing a decision with 
another party who has already demonstrated standing. 
C.  The Circuit Courts’ Categorical Approach 
While some circuit courts have extended the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
in Diamond to preclude parties without Article III standing from 
intervening,130 most have taken the apparent McConnell approach and 
treated the Rule 24(a)(2) requirements as the only barrier to intervention.131  
 
 120. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 121. See Diamond, 476 U.S. at 64–68; see also supra notes 90–92 and accompanying 
text. 
 122. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. at 233. 
 125. Id. 
 126. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
 127. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text; see also Elizabeth Zwickert 
Timmermans, Has the Bowsher Doctrine Solved the Debate?:  The Relationship Between 
Standing and Intervention as of Right, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1411, 1449 (2009). 
 128. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
 129. See McConnell, 540 U.S. 93. 
 130. See City of Chicago v. FEMA, 660 F.3d 980, 984–85 (7th Cir. 2011); United States 
v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829, 833–34 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1145–46 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 131. See Laroe Estates, Inc. v. Town of Chester, 828 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 810 (2017); King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 245–46 (3d 
Cir. 2014); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 898, 905–06 (9th Cir. 2011); City of 
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The Second and Seventh Circuits exemplify these two approaches.132  
While the Seventh Circuit requires standing to intervene,133 the Second 
Circuit has held as recently as July 2016 that intervenors do not require 
Article III standing.134  To compare these two methodologies, Part II.A.1 
examines the Seventh Circuit’s categorical standing requirement for 
intervenors of right and Part II.A.2 discusses the Second Circuit’s more lax 
approach. 
1.  The Seventh Circuit Approach 
In City of Chicago v. FEMA,135 the Seventh Circuit held that “no case 
can be maintained in a federal court by a party who lacks Article III 
standing.”136  The court further noted that Article III standing is insufficient 
to establish a Rule 24(a)(2) interest and vice versa.137  The court justified 
this stance with efficiency concerns138 and noted that “[t]he cases that 
dispense with the requirement overlook the fact that even if a case is 
securely within federal jurisdiction by virtue of the stakes of the existing 
parties, an intervenor may be seeking relief different from that sought by 
any of the original parties.”139  Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit did not 
address why a standing inquiry is still appropriate where the claims and 
relief requested are substantially the same.  Although the court noted that 
other “limiting principles”140 were necessary to ascertain the scope of 
intervention, it failed to delineate these principles, finding them 
inapplicable to the case at hand to the extent they existed.141 
2.  The Second Circuit Approach 
In its most recent decision on intervenor standing, Laroe Estates, Inc. v. 
Town of Chester,142 the Second Circuit held that standing is not a 
requirement for intervention.143  Laroe Estates sought to intervene pursuant 
to Rule 24 in a takings case under the theory that it held equitable title in 
the property subject to the original takings case.144  Laroe Estates’s 
 
Herriman v. Bell, 590 F.3d 1176, 1183–84 (10th Cir. 2010); Dillard v. Chilton Cty. 
Comm’n, 495 F.3d 1324, 1336–37 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Tennessee, 260 F.3d 
587, 595 (6th Cir. 2001); Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 829–30 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 132. See, e.g., Laroe Estates, 828 F.3d 60; City of Chicago, 660 F.3d 980. 
 133. See City of Chicago, 660 F.3d 980. 
 134. See Laroe Estates, 828 F.3d 60. 
 135. 660 F.3d 980 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 136. Id. at 985. 
 137. See id. at 984–85. 
 138. See id. at 985 (“[S]o little is required for Article III standing that if no more were 
required for intervention as a matter of right, intervention would be too easy and clutter too 
many lawsuits with too many parties.”). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. 828 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 810 (2017). 
 143. See id. at 64. 
 144. See Sherman v. Town of Chester, No. 12 Civ. 647(ER), 2015 WL 1473430, at *15 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2015). 
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proposed complaint asserted only that it was entitled to relief for the taking 
of its real property.145 
The Southern District of New York denied Laroe Estates’s motion, 
holding that because only an owner of property may assert a takings claim, 
a claim of equitable title failed to establish the necessary legal relationship 
between Laroe Estates and the Town of Chester and thus did not confer the 
standing required to intervene in the takings claim.146 
 The Second Circuit rejected the district court’s reasoning, holding 
that “‘there [is] no need to impose the standing requirement upon [a] 
proposed intervenor’ where ‘[t]he existence of a case or controversy [has] 
been established’ in the underlying litigation.”147  The court went on to 
conclude that a party seeking to intervene will survive a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim so long as it does not assert any further grounds 
for relief.148  However, the court failed to address the effect such a request 
for further or different relief would have on the standing requirement.149 
III.  IF YOU DON’T STAND FOR SOMETHING, 
YOU’LL FALL FOR ANYTHING 
A categorical rule requiring standing does not adequately address the 
practical and jurisdictional intervention problems.  To highlight the 
insufficiency of such an approach, Part III.A discusses why neither the 
intervention nor the standing inquiries are suited to address jurisdictional 
and procedural requirements, Part III.B underlines the problems with 
applying an unconditional standard, and Part III.C concludes that an 
intervenor’s standing is relevant only in specific circumstances because a 
standing analysis is necessary only when the Case or Controversy Clause is 
implicated. 
A.  Neither the Intervention nor the Standing Inquiry 
Can Subsume the Other 
Even though much of the initial confusion regarding the relationship 
between standing and intervention of right stems from the varied 
interpretations of the interest requirement,150 the focus on the relationship 
between the standing inquiry and the intervention inquiry is a red herring.  
Whereas the interest requirement of the intervention inquiry examines the 
merits, a standing analysis examines “whether the interest sought to be 
protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be 
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in 
question.”151  These two analyses are inherently different because they 
 
 145. See Proposed Complaint at 16, Sherman, 2015 WL 1473430 (No. 12 Civ. 647(ER)). 
 146. Sherman, 2015 WL 1473430, at *15–16. 
 147. Laroe Estates, 828 F.3d at 64 (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 
190 (2d Cir. 1978)). 
 148. Id. at 66 (citing Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528 (1972)). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 151. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). 
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examine different factors—overlap in the nuclei of facts and law should not 
be confused with similarity between the standards. 
Although a more consistent interest standard should be adopted for the 
sake of uniformity and procedural efficiency, the interest standard actually 
has no bearing on the question of whether standing is required.  Regardless 
of whether Article III standing is required to intervene, the lack of a 
uniform interest requirement will still produce erratic results among the 
circuits.152 
B.  The Functional Problems with a Categorical Approach 
Neither categorically requiring nor disposing of the standing requirement 
adequately addresses these important distinctions.  Part III.B.1 emphasizes 
why always requiring intervenors to independently satisfy the Article III 
standing requirements is an undesirable solution, and Part III.B.2 explains 
why never requiring standing goes beyond federal courts’ Article III 
powers. 
1.  Why Stand When You Can Sit? 
Requiring Article III standing for all intervenors of right presents 
substantial practical and legal difficulties.  Part II.C.1.a considers why this 
approach is unnecessarily underinclusive, and Part II.C.1.b deals with the 
conflict between requiring Article III standing and the purpose of Rule 24. 
a.  Requiring Standing for Rule 24(a)(2) Intervention 
Is Underinclusive 
Requiring Article III standing for all intervenors would exclude many 
individuals from the litigation process without advancing the standing 
requirement’s goals.153  For example, many circuits have more lax 
standards for intervenors in public law disputes.154  Requiring standing for 
all intervenors would often exclude public interest intervenors from 
representing their interests in a suit, especially where they are the 
beneficiary of the lax standard.155 
Standing is also underinclusive in terms of judicial efficiency concerns, 
particularly regarding intervenors who have an interest that is contingent 
upon the outcome of the suit.156  If standing were required, such would-be 
intervenors would neither be bound by the suit nor allowed to participate in 
it.157  Thus, they would end up with their interest unrepresented or the court 
would have another suit to entertain. 
 
 152. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 153. See supra Parts I.B.1, II.C.1. 
 154. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 155. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 156. See supra Part I.B.1.b. 
 157. See supra Part I.A.1; see also Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 756 (1989) (“Joinder 
as a party, rather than knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene, is the method 
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Categorically requiring standing also fails to serve Article III’s 
jurisdictional baseline.158  Where one party has standing to assert claims in 
a federal court, the court does not risk infringing on the other branches 
where the intervention does not widen the scope of issues presented.159 
Finally, always requiring standing does not advance the standing 
requirement’s issue presentation function.160  Similar to the jurisdictional 
baseline, a party with standing should be capable of adequately presenting 
the issues.161  As long as the intervenor’s claims and requested relief are 
identical to the original party’s, there is no risk of prejudicing other parties 
not in the suit by allowing an ill-equipped representative to litigate these 
claims.162 
b.  Requiring Standing for Rule 24(a)(2) Intervenors 
Unnecessarily Limits the Function of Rule 24 
One of the important functions of the intervention device is to allow a 
party who has an interest that is contingent upon the outcome of the suit to 
protect that interest.163  Such interests will often fail to meet the standing 
injury-in-fact requirement per se because their occurrence is uncertain.164 
Applying the injury-in-fact standard would greatly limit the role that 
Rule 24(a)(2) plays in public law litigation.165  A lax interest requirement is 
desirable from a public interest perspective because of its importance in 
protecting third parties from adverse judgments without having to 
relitigate.166 
If standing were always required to intervene, either the court-made 
interest rules regarding public and private law litigation would be 
effectively overruled, or anomalous standing exceptions of questionable 
constitutionality would need to be created.  Especially with the continual 
narrowing of standing requirements over the decades since the last 
substantial Rule 24 amendment,167 imposing a standing requirement would 
greatly limit its function relative to when it was last amended fifty years 
ago.168 
 
by which potential parties are subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound by a 
judgment or decree.”). 
 158. See supra Part I.B.1.a. 
 159. See supra Part I.B.1.a. 
 160. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 164. See supra notes 75–83 and accompanying text. 
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 166. See supra notes 100, 106–07 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 
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 168. See supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text. 
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2.  Not Requiring Standing Is Overinclusive 
Categorically permitting intervention based on an interest opens the 
courthouse doors to too many would-be intervenors.  Allowing all 
intervenors to make new claims and direct the course of the litigation, 
regardless of their constitutional standing to assert such claims, would put 
an unfair burden on the original party.  An intervenor should be able to 
piggyback on the justiciability of the original dispute where her intervention 
falls within that dispute.  An intervenor should not be able to piggyback on 
the original party’s standing to assert claims that it could not otherwise 
bring before a federal court on its own.  Intervening parties seeking 
different or further relief present a separate issue than those protecting an 
interest.  To account for this difference, federal courts should employ a 
standing analysis when they are faced with a new, discrete case or 
controversy that flows from the original dispute but does not fall within the 
court’s jurisdiction. 
C.  A Standing Analysis Is Only Necessary Where the Court 
Is Faced with a Distinct Case or Controversy 
Given the undesirable effects of a categorical approach, a bifurcated test 
is a better approach to the issue of whether standing should be analyzed for 
proposed Rule 24(a)(2) intervenors.  Under a bifurcated scheme, interest 
analysis should be employed to see if the proposed intervenor even has a 
baseline of a protectable interest.  Furthermore, courts should assess 
whether a protectable interest constitutes a new case or controversy under 
Article III.  Standing should not be required where an intervenor simply 
intervenes to protect an interest.  Having a lax interest requirement, 
combined with a standing requirement that is only triggered in certain 
instances, addresses the overinclusive/underinclusive issues and also keeps 
the process straightforward by eliminating the need to draw further 
distinctions between intervenors for the standing question.169  These case-
or-controversy triggers are finite and easily identified.  Accordingly, Part 
III.C.1 argues that intervention itself does not implicate justiciability 
concerns, Part III.C.2 discusses case-or-controversy triggers where the party 
with standing is no longer part of the suit, and Part III.C.3 discusses other 
intervenor actions that can trigger a standing analysis. 
1.  Intervention Itself Does Not Require 
an Independent Jurisdictional Analysis 
Based on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, it is clear that the 
intervention device itself does not create a new case or controversy.170  If 
coparties asserting the same claims and requesting the same relief are not 
each required to demonstrate standing,171 intervening parties should not be 
 
 169. See supra Part I.C. 
 170. See supra notes 93–95, 126–29 and accompanying text. 
 171. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986). 
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required to show independent grounds for Article III jurisdiction, because 
coparties’ and intervenors’ positions are analogous.  When an intervenor 
makes the same claims and requests the same relief, she should not have to 
show standing.172 
2.  Intervenors Must Demonstrate Standing When They Seek 
to Continue a Suit Without the Original Party’s Participation 
Where the original party that has shown standing is no longer part of the 
suit because it has declined to appeal, settled, or withdrawn its claims in 
another manner, a standing analysis is proper for the remaining party.  
Diamond and McConnell establish that this inquiry is necessary in the 
appellate context.173  Accordingly, disputes that lose the only party with 
standing likewise lose justiciability until another party can meet Article 
III’s standards.174 
3.  Discrete Claims or Requests for Separate Relief 
May Trigger a Standing Analysis 
If at any point during the litigation an intervenor amends her complaint to 
assert different claims or request different or further relief, a standing 
analysis is appropriate.  Such an amendment represents a distinct case or 
controversy and is therefore subject to constitutional limits on federal 
jurisdiction.175  Confusion surrounds this doctrine because circuit courts 
that require standing allow Rule 24(a)(2) movants to intervene on equal 
footing with the original parties, whereas circuits that have a more 
permissive view of intervention have less clearly defined intervenor 
roles.176  The better view is that an intervenor should have equal footing 
only within the confines of the established case or controversy.177 
Such an approach is proper because federal courts are required to dismiss 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction whenever the lack of jurisdiction 
becomes apparent.178  Thus, a standing analysis should follow whenever an 
intervening party amends its pleading to assert new or amended claims even 
if that party originally intervened asserting the same claims as the original 
party and the court, properly, did not analyze standing. 
Although some authorities recognize supplemental jurisdiction as a 
justification for allowing intervenors to assert counterclaims,179 jurisdiction 
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over such claims is not proper because Congress has not created statutory 
authority to do so and actually does not have the power to under Lujan.180  
This interpretation is supported by the Supreme Court in DaimlerChrysler 
Corp. v. Cuno181: 
What we have never done is apply [the supplemental jurisdiction] 
rationale of Gibbs to permit a federal court to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over a claim that does not itself satisfy those elements of the 
Article III inquiry, such as constitutional standing, that “serv[e] to identify 
those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial 
process.”182 
Thus, parties seeking to assert independent counterclaims, requesting 
further relief, or asserting different claims should have to independently 
demonstrate standing.  Those advancing different theories for achieving the 
same goals as the original parties should not. 
CONCLUSION 
Although courts and scholars put great emphasis on defining the 
relationship between the Case or Controversy Clause and Rule 24(a)(2), this 
emphasis is futile.  Intervention requirements are triggered where a 
proposed party makes a motion to intervene.  The standing inquiry is 
relevant where a new case or controversy is created.  Although the two 
doctrines may be implicated where a proposed intervenor asserts different 
or further relief, they are, and should remain, separate. 
Ultimately, construing intervention as a distinct case or controversy has 
no basis in constitutional limits or Supreme Court jurisprudence.  A 
standing analysis is necessary for an intervenor where the party whose 
standing she has piggybacked on is no longer part of the suit or where 
claims she asserts—asserting different claims or requesting different 
relief—go beyond the case or controversy on which she has piggybacked.  
This approach allows an expanded group of individuals to enter a suit to 
protect their rights without running afoul of Article III’s requirements or 
compromising judicial effectiveness and efficiency. 
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